🇰🇷 한글 설명
리눅스 커널의 swiotlb 구성 요소에서 DMA_FROM_DEVICE 사용 시 정보 유출 취약점이 발견되었습니다. SCSI TUR 명령과 같이 장치가 데이터를 실제로 쓰지 않는 상황에서, swiotlb의 바운스 버퍼에 남아있던 이전 I/O 데이터가 사용자 공간 버퍼로 복사되어 유출될 수 있습니다.
💡 쉬운 설명
컴퓨터가 데이터를 주고받을 때 사용하는 임시 저장 공간에 이전 작업의 흔적이 남아있어, 이를 통해 다른 데이터가 몰래 노출될 수 있는 문제입니다. 특정 명령을 내릴 때 시스템이 실수로 이 흔적을 사용자에게 전달하면서 발생합니다.
🇺🇸 원문 (English)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
swiotlb: fix info leak with DMA_FROM_DEVICE
The problem I'm addressing was discovered by the LTP test covering
cve-2018-1000204.
A short description of what happens follows:
1) The test case issues a command code 00 (TEST UNIT READY) via the SG_IO
interface with: dxfer_len == 524288, dxdfer_dir == SG_DXFER_FROM_DEV
and a corresponding dxferp. The peculiar thing about this is that TUR
is not reading from the device.
2) In sg_start_req() the invocation of blk_rq_map_user() effectively
bounces the user-space buffer. As if the device was to transfer into
it. Since commit a45b599ad808 ("scsi: sg: allocate with __GFP_ZERO in
sg_build_indirect()") we make sure this first bounce buffer is
allocated with GFP_ZERO.
3) For the rest of the story we keep ignoring that we have a TUR, so the
device won't touch the buffer we prepare as if the we had a
DMA_FROM_DEVICE type of situation. My setup uses a virtio-scsi device
and the buffer allocated by SG is mapped by the function
virtqueue_add_split() which uses DMA_FROM_DEVICE for the "in" sgs (here
scatter-gather and not scsi generics). This mapping involves bouncing
via the swiotlb (we need swiotlb to do virtio in protected guest like
s390 Secure Execution, or AMD SEV).
4) When the SCSI TUR is done, we first copy back the content of the second
(that is swiotlb) bounce buffer (which most likely contains some
previous IO data), to the first bounce buffer, which contains all
zeros. Then we copy back the content of the first bounce buffer to
the user-space buffer.
5) The test case detects that the buffer, which it zero-initialized,
ain't all zeros and fails.
One can argue that this is an swiotlb problem, because without swiotlb
we leak all zeros, and the swiotlb should be transparent in a sense that
it does not affect the outcome (if all other participants are well
behaved).
Copying the content of the original buffer into the swiotlb buffer is
the only way I can think of to make swiotlb transparent in such
scenarios. So let's do just that if in doubt, but allow the driver
to tell us that the whole mapped buffer is going to be overwritten,
in which case we can preserve the old behavior and avoid the performance
impact of the extra bounce.
📍 영향받는 시스템
swiotlb를 사용하는 리눅스 커널 (특히 virtio-scsi 및 AMD SEV/s390 Secure Execution 환경)
⚔️ 공격 벡터
특정 SCSI 명령(TUR 등)을 통해 DMA 전송을 유도하여 swiotlb 바운스 버퍼 내의 잔류 데이터를 읽어내는 방식
🛡️ 대응 방법
리눅스 커널을 최신 보안 패치가 적용된 버전으로 업데이트하십시오.
🔧 검증 코드
출력된 커널 버전이 해당 취약점이 해결된 패치 버전 이후인지 확인하십시오.