🇰🇷 한글 설명
sudo-rs 0.2.1 이전 버전은 사용자 이름에 특수 문자가 포함될 경우 파일 경로 조작을 허용하여 시스템 파일 손상 취약점이 존재합니다. 공격자가 악성 사용자명을 생성하고 sudo 명령어를 실행하면 `/bin/cp`와 같은 핵심 바이너리가 삭제될 수 있습니다.
💡 쉬운 설명
사용자 이름에 이상한 문자를 넣어 시스템의 중요한 파일을 삭제할 수 있는 버그입니다. 이 문제를 해결하려면 sudo-rs 프로그램을 최신 버전으로 업데이트해야 합니다.
🇺🇸 원문 (English)
Sudo-rs, a memory safe implementation of sudo and su, allows users to not have to enter authentication at every sudo attempt, but instead only requiring authentication every once in a while in every terminal or process group. Only once a configurable timeout has passed will the user have to re-authenticate themselves. Supporting this functionality is a set of session files (timestamps) for each user, stored in `/var/run/sudo-rs/ts`. These files are named according to the username from which the sudo attempt is made (the origin user).
An issue was discovered in versions prior to 0.2.1 where usernames containing the `.` and `/` characters could result in the corruption of specific files on the filesystem. As usernames are generally not limited by the characters they can contain, a username appearing to be a relative path can be constructed. For example we could add a user to the system containing the username `../../../../bin/cp`. When logged in as a user with that name, that user could run `sudo -K` to clear their session record file. The session code then constructs the path to the session file by concatenating the username to the session file storage directory, resulting in a resolved path of `/bin/cp`. The code then clears that file, resulting in the `cp` binary effectively being removed from the system.
An attacker needs to be able to login as a user with a constructed username. Given that such a username is unlikely to exist on an existing system, they will also need to be able to create the users with the constructed usernames.
The issue is patched in version 0.2.1 of sudo-rs. Sudo-rs now uses the uid for the user instead of their username for determining the filename. Note that an upgrade to this version will result in existing session files being ignored and users will be forced to re-authenticate. It also fully eliminates any possibility of path traversal, given that uids are always integer values.
The `sudo -K` and `sudo -k` commands can run, even if a user has no sudo access. As a workaround, make sure that one's system does not contain any users with a specially crafted username. While this is the case and while untrusted users do not have the ability to create arbitrary users on the system, one should not be able to exploit this issue.
📍 영향받는 시스템
sudo-rs version < 0.2.1
⚔️ 공격 벡터
악성 사용자명 생성 후 sudo -K 명령어 실행을 통한 파일 경로 조작 및 시스템 파일 삭제
🛡️ 대응 방법
sudo-rs를 버전 0.2.1 이상으로 업그레이드하여 UID 기반 파일명 사용으로 전환
🔧 검증 코드
출력된 버전이 0.2.1 미만이면 취약하며, 0.2.1 이상이면 패치된 상태입니다.
sudo-rs --version 2>/dev/null | grep -E '0\.[01]\.'