🔍 CVE-2026-74618

🇺🇸 원문 (English)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: binfmt_misc: don't warn when the mount is completed from another user namespace fsopen() records the caller's user namespace in fc->user_ns and hands back an ordinary file descriptor. Nothing ties the task that calls fsconfig(FSCONFIG_CMD_CREATE) to the task that created the context. The fd is inherited across fork() and exec() and it can be passed over a unix socket. Completing a context from another user namespace is allowed on purpose. vfs_cmd_create() authorizes the create with mount_capable(), which for FS_USERNS_MOUNT checks ns_capable(fc->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN), and that succeeds for a task holding CAP_SYS_ADMIN in an ancestor of fc->user_ns. So an unprivileged task can reach the WARN_ON() in bm_fill_super(): create a user and a mount namespace in a child, call fsopen("binfmt_misc") there, send the fscontext fd to the parent and let the parent issue FSCONFIG_CMD_CREATE. Both namespaces come from a plain unshare(1) and no capability is needed anywhere: WARNING: fs/binfmt_misc.c:938 at bm_fill_super+0xa2/0xc0 [binfmt_misc] CPU: 15 UID: 1000 PID: 3243382 Comm: fswarn Call Trace: get_tree_keyed+0x7d/0xb0 bm_get_tree+0x34/0x90 [binfmt_misc] vfs_get_tree+0x2a/0x100 vfs_cmd_create+0x60/0xf0 __do_sys_fsconfig+0x4b2/0x500 The child needs the mount namespace because fsopen() itself gates on may_mount(), which asks for CAP_SYS_ADMIN in the user namespace owning the caller's mount namespace. fsconfig() doesn't repeat that check. It is a WARN_ON() and not a WARN_ON_ONCE(), so the condition can be raised in a loop to taint the kernel and flood the log, and it panics a kernel booted with panic_on_warn. Keep refusing the mount and stop warning about it. Nothing in bm_fill_super() depends on the two namespaces matching, it derives everything from sb->s_user_ns.