🇰🇷 한글 설명
qs.stringify 함수가 특정 속성을 가진 객체를 직렬화할 때 TypeError를 발생시키는 취약점입니다. 공격자가 조작된 입력값을 통해 constructor.isBuffer 속성을 함수가 아닌 값으로 설정하면 프로그램이 예기치 않게 중단될 수 있습니다.
💡 쉬운 설명
데이터를 문자열로 바꾸는 과정에서 특정 규칙을 가진 가짜 데이터를 넣으면 프로그램이 오류를 일으키며 멈출 수 있습니다. 이는 서비스가 갑자기 종료되거나 응답하지 않는 상태를 만들 수 있습니다.
🇺🇸 원문 (English)
### Summary
`qs.stringify` throws a `TypeError` when it serializes an object whose own `constructor` property has a truthy, non-callable `isBuffer` member. `utils.isBuffer` duck-types buffers by calling `obj.constructor.isBuffer(obj)` after checking only that the property is truthy, so a value such as `{ constructor: { isBuffer: "x" } }` makes the call throw `TypeError: obj.constructor.isBuffer is not a function`.
### Details
`lib/stringify.js:127` calls `utils.isBuffer` on every non-primitive value it serializes. `utils.isBuffer` (`lib/utils.js:332`) reads `obj.constructor.isBuffer` and invokes it without verifying that it is a function. `constructor` and `isBuffer` are ordinary property names, so any object carrying them as own properties reaches the unchecked call.
Such an object can be built from untrusted input. `qs.parse("x[constructor][isBuffer]=y", { plainObjects: true })` or `{ allowPrototypes: true }` keeps the `constructor` key as an own property (the default parse options drop it), and `JSON.parse("{\"a\":{\"constructor\":{\"isBuffer\":\"x\"}}}")` produces the same shape with no qs option involved. Express 4 with its default `query parser` setting and body-parser with `extended: true` both call `qs.parse` with `allowPrototypes: true`, so on those stacks `req.query` and `req.body` can carry the shape directly.
#### PoC
```js
var qs = require("qs");
qs.stringify(qs.parse("x[constructor][isBuffer]=y", { plainObjects: true }));
qs.stringify(JSON.parse("{\"a\":{\"constructor\":{\"isBuffer\":\"x\"}}}"));
// TypeError: obj.constructor.isBuffer is not a function
// at Object.isBuffer (lib/utils.js:332:78)
// at stringify (lib/stringify.js:127:45)
```
#### Fix
`lib/utils.js`, applied in e83d321 on `main` and released as v6.16.0:
```diff
- return !!(obj.constructor && obj.constructor.isBuffer && obj.constructor.isBuffer(obj));
+ return !!(obj.constructor && typeof obj.constructor.isBuffer === "function" && obj.constructor.isBuffer(obj));
```
Real `Buffer`, `safer-buffer`, and browserify `buffer` polyfill instances serialize exactly as before; only the throw is removed.
### Affected versions
`>=2.2.5 <6.16.0`, fixed in v6.16.0.
The unguarded duck-type was introduced in 3768a75 and first shipped in v2.2.5 (September 2014). v2.2.4 and earlier used `Buffer.isBuffer` and are not affected. Every release from v2.2.5 through v6.15.3 contains the unguarded call.
### Impact
An unauthenticated request can make any code path that re-serializes attacker-influenced data with `qs.stringify` (for example, rebuilding a query string from `req.query` for a redirect or an upstream request, or serializing a parsed JSON body) throw synchronously. In a typical Node.js HTTP framework the throw is caught by the framework error boundary and the affected request returns a 500; the process survives and other requests are unaffected. Where the call runs outside an error boundary, such as an `async` Express 4 handler (where the throw becomes an unhandled promise rejection) or a background job, the process exits, so the impact in that case depends on the application error handling rather than on qs.
📍 영향받는 시스템
qs library versions >=2.2.5 and <6.16.0
⚔️ 공격 벡터
조작된 JSON 또는 쿼리 스트링을 통해 constructor.isBuffer가 함수가 아닌 값을 포함한 객체를 전송
🛡️ 대응 방법
qs 라이브러리를 v6.16.0 이상 버전으로 업데이트
🔧 검증 코드
출력된 qs의 버전이 2.2.5 이상 6.16.0 미만인지 확인