🔍 CVE-2026-92916

🇺🇸 원문 (English)

Grav is a flat-file CMS. In Grav 1.7.0 through 1.7.53.2 and 2.0.0 through 2.0.21, when the debugger is enabled (system.debugger.enabled: true, which is not the default), the Clockwork profiler endpoint is exposed without authentication: InitializeProcessor::handleDebuggerRequest() intercepts any path containing /__clockwork/ during bootstrap and passes it to Debugger::debuggerRequest(), which performs no user lookup, IP restriction, or Clockwork authenticator check, and also supports anonymous pagination over the entire stored history. With the shipped censored: false default, each stored record contains raw request cookies (including Grav's session cookie, whose value is the PHP session id, allowing an attacker to resume another user's session, including an authenticated admin's), the full parsed request body (Grav's login form posts data[username]/data[password], so passwords are stored in plaintext because Clockwork's password filter only inspects top-level keys), and the site's entire system and plugin configuration, including operator-saved secrets such as SMTP credentials, third-party API keys, and licence keys. Authorization and X-API-Token headers are stored even when censored: true. On Grav 2.0, setting provider: debugbar does not avoid the issue because Grav forces the Clockwork provider for requests preferring a JSON response. The issue is fixed in 1.7.53.4 and 2.0.22, which restrict /__clockwork/ to server-local requests or requests presenting the new system.debugger.token secret and strip cookies and credential headers from stored records. Workarounds include setting debugger.enabled: false or blocking /__clockwork/ at the web server or CDN.