🇰🇷 한글 설명
리눅스 커널의 네트워크 서브시스템에서 tx_queue_len 값에 대한 상한선 제한이 없어 발생하는 메모리 고갈 취약점입니다. 권한이 없는 사용자가 네트워크 네임스페이스를 생성한 후 매우 큰 tx_queue_len 값을 설정하면, 커널이 과도한 링 버퍼를 할당하게 되어 시스템 메모리가 고갈(OOM)될 수 있습니다.
💡 쉬운 설명
해커가 시스템의 메모리를 전부 써버리게 만들어 컴퓨터를 멈추게 할 수 있는 결함입니다. 네트워크 설정값을 비정상적으로 크게 조작하여 컴퓨터의 자원을 바닥나게 만드는 방식입니다.
🇺🇸 원문 (English)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: cap tx_queue_len at S16_MAX to prevent oversized ring allocations
Several subsystems allocate ring buffers sized by dev->tx_queue_len
with no upper bound. An unprivileged user (via unshare -Urn) can set a
huge tx_queue_len and exhaust global memory with ring allocations:
- pfifo_fast: pfifo_fast_init() and pfifo_fast_change_tx_queue_len()
allocate 3 skb_array rings of tx_queue_len entries each.
- tun: tun_queue_resize() and the queue-attach path resize ptr_rings
to tx_queue_len on the NETDEV_CHANGE_TX_QUEUE_LEN notifier.
- tap (macvtap/ipvtap): tap_queue_resize() and tap_init() resize/init
ptr_rings to tx_queue_len on the same notifier.
netif_change_tx_queue_len() is the single entry point for IFLA_TXQLEN,
sysfs, and the SIOCSIFTXQLEN ioctl. Cap new_len at S16_MAX (32767)
there so the oversized value is rejected at set time. This takes
effect whether the device is up or down, before dev->tx_queue_len is
written, before any notifier fires, and before any ring is allocated.
The "> S16_MAX" check also subsumes the previous unsigned-long
truncation test, and a negative ifr_qlen from the ioctl lands far
above the cap after conversion, so both old failure modes are covered
by the one comparison.
tx_queue_len is ambigious: both a per-ring sizing multiplier and a
default queue-length/limit knob for consumers that allocate
nothing at set time (pfifo/bfifo/gred/plug/sfb limits, htb
direct_qlen, qfq max_classes, teql). 32767 is chosen as the largest
value NLA_POLICY_FULL_RANGE can express for the u32 IFLA_TXQLEN
policy in patch 2/3 while staying a legitimate queue length on
high-BDP paths; the ring-memory trade-off of a shared knob is
disclosed below.
Conditions to recreate the bug:
- CONFIG_NET_SCHED=y, CONFIG_VETH=y, CONFIG_USER_NS=y, CONFIG_NET_NS=y.
- Unprivileged user in a fresh user+net namespace (unshare -Urn).
- pfifo_fast: create veth pairs, set tx_queue_len to 500000, attach
mq+pfifo_fast. ~28 iterations OOMs a 2GB guest.
- tun: create 50 tun devices with IFF_MULTI_QUEUE, set tx_queue_len to
500000, open 8 queues each. ~1.6GB of ptr_ring allocations OOMs a
512MB guest.
- tap: same as tun with IFF_TAP. ~960MB OOMs a 512MB guest.
- On the fixed kernel the oversized tx_queue_len is rejected with
-ERANGE at set time (all four paths: RTM_SETLINK, RTM_NEWLINK
create, sysfs, ioctl - the latter two via this check, the former
two via this check and the 2/3 parse policy respectively).
📍 영향받는 시스템
CONFIG_NET_SCH, CONFIG_VETH, CONFIG_USER_NS, CONFIG_NET_NS가 활성화된 리눅스 커널
⚔️ 공격 벡터
unshare -Urn을 통해 생성된 사용자 네임스페이스 내에서 veth, tun, tap 장치의 tx_queue_len을 매우 큰 값으로 설정
🛡️ 대응 방법
tx_queue_len 값을 S16_MAX(32767)로 제한하는 패치가 적용된 최신 리눅스 커널로 업데이트
🔧 검증 코드
출력된 커널 버전이 해당 취약점이 해결된 패치 버전 이후인지 확인하십시오.